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Abstract  
 
The following essay discusses the policy changes the Ghent countries Sweden and 
Denmark have had in the last fifteen years that possibly affected the union 
density. Furthermore the essay has a statistical approach and aim to investigate 
and discuss the factors that affects union density as well as being a contribution to 
the field of political science. By applying power resource theory the ambition of 
the essay have been to highlight reforms that have concerned and lead to conflicts 
between different socio- economic groups in society. This kind of conflicts occurs 
in all levels of society, in this essay the conflicts on a governmental level is 
emphasized. Moreover, the analyses continues with discussing the different 
governmental parties view on labor unions and they position on the labor market 
and from that conclude which type of reforms typically lead to a change in 
unionization. 
 
Key words: Labor union, power resource theory, Ghent system, class conflict, 
membership 
Words: 9234 
 
  
Table of contents 
1	   Introduction............................................................................................................. 4	  
1.1	   Outline and disposition....................................................................................... 6	  
2	   Litterateur review ................................................................................................... 1	  
3	   Method ..................................................................................................................... 2	  
3.1	   Methodological choices...................................................................................... 2	  
3.2	   Limitations ......................................................................................................... 3	  
4	   Material.................................................................................................................... 4	  
5	   Data .......................................................................................................................... 5	  
5.1	   The price off the membership fee ...................................................................... 5	  
5.2	   Net replacement rate........................................................................................... 5	  
6	   Background ............................................................................................................. 8	  
6.1	   Sweden ............................................................................................................... 8	  
6.2	   Denmark ............................................................................................................. 9	  
7	   Theoretical framework......................................................................................... 10	  
7.1	   Parties in parliament and their view on labor unions ....................................... 10	  
7.2	   Power resource theory...................................................................................... 11	  
8	   Analysis .................................................................................................................. 13	  
8.1	   Identifying the labor unions power resources .................................................. 13	  
8.2	   The price development of the unemployment funds ........................................ 14	  
8.3	   The unemployment funds replacement rates as a factor .................................. 17	  
9	   Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 21	  
10	   Suggestions on future research............................................................................ 23	  
11	   References.............................................................................................................. 24	  
 
 
  
1 Introduction 
 
 
 
With the background of a decreasing degree of unionization in many countries, it 
is somewhat remarkable that four countries have a relatively high degree of 
members in the labor unions. These countries are Sweden, Finland, Denmark and 
Belgium (Van Daele 2006: 647). Similar for these countries is that they have non-
mandatory unemployment insurance funds. The funds are subsidized by the state 
but are administrated by the labor unions. This system is called Ghent system and 
is built on the principle of unemployment insurance not being mandatory 
regulated by the state (Lind 2007: 52). The Ghent system depends on 
administration from the labor unions within each country but is regulated by the 
state and co-funded by tax deductions and subsidies (Lind 2007: 50). Even though 
the funds are administrated by the labor unions, membership in an unemployment 
fund does not mean membership within a union. The access of the unemployment 
funds are not directly connected to the membership fee the worker pays for 
membership and representation by the union. The unemployment funds are in 
many cases separated from the part of the union that represents the workers. This 
system makes it possible to be member in one union and have unemployment 
insurance with another union. Even though the union does not control the 
unemployment fund, workers tend to become members and have their 
unemployment funds within the same union (Lind 2007: 53).  
Labor unions are interest groups for individuals in the labor force that wish to 
be represented by a union in relations to the employers. Historically the unions 
have mostly been seen together with the working class (Rothstein 1992: 33), e.g. 
in production and manufacturing. However, that has certainly changed. Today the 
unions represent not only the working class but there are also white-collar unions 
as well as blue-collar ones1.  
One of the fundamentals for the labor unions and their political power is a 
rather high level of members. The possibility of the unions utilizing their power is 
by members of the labor force becoming members of the union. A high degree of 
unionization is of great importance for the unions to remain as a powerful actor in 
the labor market. Especially when the labor market is subjected to phenomenon 
such as globalization, transformation on the labor market, and economic 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Blue- collar unions typically organize workers within manufacturing and production. White- collar unions on 
the other side organize workers with higher education and that hold job in more formal settings (Kjellberg 2011: 
73).    
  
recession, it will be a necessity for the union to attract members (Sverke & 
Hellgren 2002: 12-13). The unemployment funds have typically been strongly 
related. Those who have become members of unemployment funds have also 
become members in a labor union as well. The reason for this is partly solidarism 
and political reason but as well as that many workers do not know about the 
possibility of only being a member of an unemployment fund (Clasen & Viebrock 
2008: 442, 445). However, this bond between unemployment funds and labor 
unions is getting weaker by time (Lind 2009: 510). Some of the potential reasons 
are going to be investigated further in the essay. 
 
Figure 1. 
The graph presents the degree of union density within the four Ghent countries. As illustrated 
Sweden has the highest levels on unionization of the four countries, with Denmark and Finland 
close behind. The Scandinavian countries have of some of the world’s highest levels of union 
density2 (Kjellberg 2002: 44).  
 
On one hand the purpose of this essay is to investigate factors that can explain the 
declining degree of unionization in Denmark and Sweden. However, there is 
another purpose as well, contributing to political science. The aim of this essay is 
to use power resource theory and quantitative material to analyze and discuss the 
different degree of unionization in two countries with the Ghent system. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2 Union density is defined as the proportion of the labor force having membership within the 
labor unions (Codebook: Comparative political data set I 1960-2011). The term unionization 
is used to describe the procedure of workers becoming members in the labor unions.  
 
  
Furthermore the essay aims to investigate and discuss possible underlying factors 
that affect unionization in countries with an applied Ghent system. The focus in 
the essay is on the last ten to fifteen years and especially focuses in policy 
changes in the welfare state. This leads to the research question of this essay:  
 
How come governmental policy changes affect the degree of unionization and can 
the adaptation of the policies be explained by power recourse theory? 
 
The hypothesis for this research is that governmental policy changes affect the 
labor union density (Van Rie et al. 2011: 126). Different political parties have 
diverse views on labor unions and their position on the labor market, i.e. which 
position and how much power they should have on the labor market. The way 
different parties reform the welfare state in general, but the unemployment 
insurance in particular has an impact on the levels of members in the labor unions 
(Huber & Stephens 2000: 336-338). Power resource theory implicates that with a 
center- right wing government a class conflict appear. Hence, it is reasonable to 
assume that center- right wing parties, when in government, tend to decrease the 
funding to unemployment funds and in that way try to decrease the power 
resource of the labor unions. (SOURCE) 
 
1.1 Outline and disposition 
 
The essay starts with a short introduction to inform the reader about the subject of 
labor union density and the Ghent system. The following segments discuss the 
methodological choices and obstacles as well as the limitations of the essay. After 
the methodological discussions follow the presentation of material, both literature 
and statistical data set. The statistical parts include a short introduction to the two 
variables and how these are calculated, and illustrated in different graphs. The 
presentation of the two cases, Denmark and Sweden is brief to be able to swiftly 
move on to the theoretical framework where power resource theory is presented 
and discussed. Putting together the material and theory leads to the analysis. 
Parted in two to be easy to follow and understand. The conclusion summarizes the 
analysis and discusses whether or not the hypothesis is valid for this case or not. 
Lastly there is a short section on ideas for future research.
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2 Literature review 
In this essay I primarily used authors that write about labor unions and their 
impact on the labor market. What is mutual for many of the authors is that they 
believe that the unemployment funds have a strong correlation with the degree of 
unionization (Van Rie et al 2011: 127; Lind 2007: 53). My essay therefore starts 
in the same idea. How come the unemployment funds affect the membership 
levels of the labor unions?  Some of the literature for this essay discusses the 
countries with a Ghent system and how the voluntary unemployment funds affect 
the membership levels (Lind 2007, 2009; Van Rie et al 2011); others discuss the 
reforms that the unemployment funds have been subjected to (Huber & Stephens 
2000; Kjellberg 2002, 2010). Finally some of the literature discusses the power 
resource theory as a model of explanation for the declining membership in the 
labor unions (Korpi 1998; Korpi & Palme 2003; Rothstein 1992).  
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3 Method 
In this section the methodological choices for the essay will be presented. This 
segment includes both the basis of the selection as well as presenting and 
discussing the limitations. 
 
3.1 Methodological choices  
To highlight and emphasize the problems and results in the essay I have used 
comparative case study. Even though the Ghent countries are only four I have 
chosen to compare only two of them (Van Rie et al. 2011: 125), The reason for 
this is being able to analyze Sweden and Denmark deeper and more thoroughly. 
By choosing only two cases I hope to bring awareness and understanding to 
the case of unemployment insurances as a factor that affects the degree of 
unionization. I am using the following Ghent countries in the comparative 
analysis: Sweden and Denmark. The reason for not using Finland and Belgium as 
well is that; in the case if Belgium their system varies quite a bit although it is 
regarded as a country with partial Ghent system (Van Daele 2006: 647). In 
regards to Finland the country was chosen not to be a part of this essay because 
the union density between Sweden and Finland are more similar then Denmark 
and Sweden, and Denmark and Finland also have very similar development the 
last fifteen years (Figure 1). As a result Denmark and Sweden were chosen for the 
analysis of this essay.   
The method I am using is hypothetical deductive; by trying the hypothesis to 
the empirical material and from there analyze it further the hypothesis will either 
be proven accurate or not. For this method it is important to have a hypothesis that 
is based on proving either the theory or the consequences derived from the 
empirical material. The ability to draw general conclusions will therefore be 
difficult (Teorell & Svensson 2007: 49-51). The purpose of using this method is to 
try the potential outcome to the empirical material and from there be able to come 
to a decision whether it should be dismissed or not.   
The selection of countries for this research is done by so called method of 
difference. All of the cases are similar to begin with but have differentiated 
outcomes (Teorell & Svensson 2007: 226). The cases of Sweden and Denmark 
have common factors such as population, membership in the European Union, 
OECD countries, and the way they organize their unemployment funds 
(Comparative political data set I 1960-2011). Even though the countries have 
similarities the one difference that I aim to investigate is why the union density 
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varies. So, the cases have, from these factors basically the same starting point. 
However, what is interesting is how they have ended up with different degree of 
union density. As Teorell and Svensson (2007: 226) writes, the factors A, B, C, 
and D are all similar but not the factor that is determined as variable X. Thus, 
population, EU, OECD, and how they organize their unemployment funds are 
regarded the same. The variable X will be two different potential factors, the price 
of membership in the unemployment fund and the second, how high the 
unemployment funds replacement rates are. This would in some ways indicate 
how strong the welfare state is.  These two X variables will be tested against the 
cases to determine which one or both possibly affects the union density in the way 
the statistical material presents it.  
By using quantitative data I have aimed to increase the validity of the essay 
with precise operationalization (Teorell & Svensson 2007: 55). When using 
statistical data variable becomes more distinct and the numbers can help us 
comprehend the effects of the variable.  
 
 
3.2 Limitations 
In every research and essay there are limitations. For this assignment I have been 
forced to make decisions for it to be realistically manageable. Deciding on only 
investigating deeper in two cases has its consequences.  While I will manage to 
have a deeper analysis on Denmark and Sweden, additional countries would lead 
to a more general analysis. The choice of only focusing on how the 
unemployment insurance affects the unionization degree as dependent on that the 
selection is made out of the four Ghent countries which varies with different 
countries unemployment system in how the unemployment insurance is 
administrated and regulated.  
Furthermore, limitation in the selection there are also restrictions in regard of 
time and space. With only so much time the amount of data and material how to 
be realistic to analyze. The other issue is the one of space, with restrictions and 
how long the essay should be, limitations was a necessity.  
The research performed is of nature hard to keep objective. The author’s 
personal views and values will inevitably affect the research. However, being 
aware of this opens up the possibility to be able to eliminate the personal view of 
off the research (Teorell & Svensson 2007: 17). 
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4 Material 
 
Primarily, for this essay I have used secondary sources such as literature and the 
statistical data sets. Firsthand sources would have been deeply interesting to use 
as way to highlight some of the upcoming sections of the essay. However, the 
primary sources I would want to use do not seem manageable to come up with for 
this essay, i.e. interviews with individuals working in the Swedish and Danish 
labor unions and their view on the matter of governmental reforms affecting 
unionization. 
For the statistical parts in the essay I have used Comparative Political Data 
Set I 1960-2011 (2013). The data set contains different socio-economic and 
political variables for 23 OECD countries. Besides that I have used: 
Unemployment replacement rates dataset among 34 welfare states, 1971-2009 
(2012). The latter dataset is an update and extension of Scruggs’s Welfare state 
entitlements data set. The usage of these datasets motivates partially by the 
trouble finding other datasets and comparing which ones would meet the 
requirement for this essay. However, both the datasets have shown to meet the 
requirements and are suitable for the statistical analyses that are being done.  
In the graphs presenting in upcoming sections there have been a couple of 
times data have been an issue. When this has occurred it has been solved by either 
leaving the said year with a gap or to calculate an average for several years and 
solves it with that technique. Nevertheless these minor problems should not affect 
the general outcome of the graphs or disturb the result in any major whey.  
Two authors that the essay relies heavily on are Korpi and Kjellberg. This is 
not seen as a negative aspect instead in is viewed in the light of them being great 
contributors to their respective subject. Either way there is a somewhat consensus 
between many of the authors used in the essay regarding political policies and 
their effect on labor unions (Lind 2007, 2009; Huber & Stephens 2000; Clasen & 
Viebrock 2009 etc.).  
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5 Data 
The focus of the essay is on how the unemployment insurance funds have an 
effect on union density and therefore the variables are circled around the 
unemployment funds. In the following section the two variables will be presented 
and in short manner discussed. Thereafter three graphs are presented with a short 
description.  
 
5.1 The price off the membership fee 
In the case of Sweden I will use data from Inspektionen för 
arbetslöshetsförsäkringen (IAF 2014). Figure 3 is calculated as an average fee for 
the unemployment insurance funds and then divided for the whole year.  
For the case of Denmark I am using statistics from the OECD (2001- 2012) 
and the report they have continuously published since 2001 for all of the years but 
2008. The rapports present numbers for the total amount per year a person pays 
for being member of insurance funds. To be able to compare the price of the fee I 
calculated from a yearly rate to a monthly rate and then as a safety precaution, 
compared them to current numbers from Ak-Samvirke (2014). The monthly rate is 
calculated for an average worker.  
Moreover, there is a slight difference between Swedish kronor and Danish 
ones in their value but in this essay this will be regarded as negligible. 
 
 
5.2 Net replacement rate 
The second variable is on what level are the unemployment replacement rates. Net 
replacement rates will indicate how high the income received will be when 
unemployed. Depending whether of the individual has a family, spouse or is 
single the percentage of the income will depend. For the replacement rates 
statistics are used from the Unemployment replacement rates dataset among 34 
welfare states, 1971-2009 (2012). 
For the purpose of this essay I have used statistics for a single person 
household. The income is counted as an average 40-year old worker.  The 
calculations for the average workers wage are from OECD (Van Vliet & 
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Caminada 2012: 5-6). Net replacement rate is the amount left after taxes and 
social contributions (Korpi & Palme 2003: 433). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  
Presented in Figure 2 is the price development of the Danish unemployment  
funds. From 2002 the prices have dramatically gone up. The price is calculated in DKK. The gap 
year of 2008 is because problems finding data (see section 3 earlier in the essay).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  
The graph illustrates the price per month for an average unemployment insurance fund. The 
price is calculated in SEK. The development differs from the development of Denmark. 
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Figure 4. 
In figure 4 the net replacement rates for Denmark and Sweden are shown. While  
the Swedish rates varies and goes up and down, Denmark’s have a more steady  
decline. 
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6 Background 
A short background centered on the countries labor union history and the 
unemployment insurance conditions will fallow as an introduction to the two 
cases of Sweden and Denmark.  
6.1 Sweden  
As presented in Figure 1, Sweden has a history of a high degree of unionization 
even though there have been a constant decreasing degree since the middle of the 
1990’s. Traditionally memberships in the labor unions and the unemployment 
insurance funds have been high. After a reform the unemployment funds have 
been separated from the unions and a membership in the union is not necessary 
for being a member of the unemployment fund (Lind 2007: 53). The 
unemployment funds according to the Ghent system were introduced in the 1935, 
some years later then Denmark. But just like Denmark the Swedish system was 
subjected for large changes during a period in the 1970’s. One of the reforms, 
which helped the unions in their pursuit of members, was the quite high level of 
benefits. Raising the benefit level helped the labor unions recruiting new members 
(Lind 2007: 58).  
In Sweden all unemployment funds but one is connected to the unions by 
administration, the one that is standing free is the so-called Alfa-fund. According 
to Kjellberg all of the unemployment funds lost members during the recession 
2007-2008, regardless if it was union-run or not (Kjellberg 2010: 42). The Alfa-
fund was established 1998 by the Federation of Unemployment Insurance. When 
Alfa-fund was founded it leads to additional labor workers joining the 
unemployment funds but not joining the unions. However, the Alfa-fund also had 
to dramatically increase their funding and as a result many members left the 
unemployment fund (Kjellberg 2011: 69).  
The conditions that a Swedish worker in need of unemployment benefits must 
fulfill are for instance: being a member of a unemployment fund for no less than 
12 months, have worked at least 80 hours a month for 6 month or more during the 
12 months right before the unemployment (Sjöberg 2011: 212). 
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6.2 Denmark 
 
 
Like Sweden, Denmark has had a quite similar development in union density. The 
difference is that while Sweden had a membership peak in the middle of the 
1990’s, Denmark peaked right after 1980 (Figure 1). Denmark never reached 
those high numbers as Sweden did; nevertheless they have had a relatively high 
degree of unionization.  As Figure 1 illustrates, Sweden and Denmark are in the 
same situation today with decreasing numbers of workers organizing in the 
unions.  
The unemployment funds were established in the beginning of the 20th 
century. The Ghent system was chosen because at the time the relatively larger 
cost was put on the individual worker and the state paid minimum for the funds. 
In the middle of the 1960’s this however changed, the state took on a bigger part 
of the funding and the smaller bits were left to the employers and the fees of the 
fund to cover (Lind 2007: 54).  
For a worker to be eligible for unemployment funds he or she must fulfill 
conditions like have been a member in a unemployment fund and paid the fees for 
at least 12 months, had a fulltime job for no less than 52 weeks the latest three 
years and when unemployed register at the unemployment office and look for new 
jobs (Lind 2007: 54). Lind (2007: 54) writes that since 1979 the conditions have 
only grown tighter. At the same time the replacement rates have considering the 
development of the wages, progressively grown smaller since the 1980’s (Lind 
2007: 54). 
In 2001 when the liberal-conservative won the election and formed 
government they proposed to set up a new form of unemployment funds. These 
funds would not have any ties to the labor unions and workers could join no 
matter what profession. Thus, they wanted to remove the already existing Ghent 
system. However, the government did not succeed, majority in parliament voted 
the proposition down and the Ghent system is still applied (Lind 2007: 56).  
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7 Theoretical framework 
Theoretical framework will present the tools for which the analysis will build on. 
Concepts as “power resource” will be defined and power relationships as “class 
conflict” will be explained. 
7.1 Parties in parliament and their view on labor 
unions 
Power resource theory examines the power resources between labor and parties 
with different ideological background with a political approach. By identifying 
the different ways of right, center, and left winged parties and by the difference of 
how, and in which extent the welfare state is constructed and what is should 
include (Huber & Stephens 2000: 325).  The composition of parties in parliament 
affects the outcome of the political policies and the budgets for the state 
economics and how strong the welfare state is.  
Depending on different parties’ ideology and values, their politics and ideas 
are different. While some parties aim to strengthen the welfare state, others aim to 
strengthen the individual’s right. The politics depends on the ideology standing 
behind the party, whether it is liberalism, socialism or conservatism. While some 
parties support the involvement of the labor unions some strive to limit their 
participation. For instance, in liberal welfare states there is a common idea of low 
involvement for the unions in the labor market, and decreasing the centralized 
collective agreements (Huber & Stephens 2000: 338). According to Huber and 
Stephens (2000: 334) the rule of social democratic parties are on of the strongest 
factor for determining the public funds for the welfare state.  
The conflicts between different socio-economical classes that are highlighted 
in power resource theory show not only in society but also in the parliament and 
by elections. Different parties represent different kind of politics that attract voters 
with similar background, economy and in other ways are homogenous (Korpi & 
Palme 2003: 427). Liberal-conservative parties typically stand for weak labor 
unions, individual work agreements and large private sector. In general socialist 
parties aim towards strong welfare ruled by the state, and strong unions as a 
counterpart to the employers on the labor market (Huber & Stephens 2000: 337-
338). Since labor unions have a historical background in socialist and leftist 
moments over all this is not surprising. Neoliberal ideas on the other hand believe 
that the relationship between an employer and employee are equal (Korpi 1998: 
51).  
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For this essay it is primarily the conflicts between the government and the 
actors of the labor market that is going to be analyzed. The class concept that 
exists in society is present in all levels, including parliamentary and governmental 
level. Class conflicts have gone from being based solely on social class and 
politics to differences and cleavages in quality of life and cultural differences 
(Korpi & Palme 2003: 425). 
Since unemployment insurance affects the worker in many ways, the 
acceptance of the lowest wage when presented with a work offer as well as 
livelihood when unemployed tends to be the part of the welfare system that 
suffers from a lot of different changes. When the conditions for unemployment 
insurance changes the time for them to set in action is not that far. Therefore it is 
an easy reform to count on in the budget. Especially when governments plan in 
short periods of time the welfare states insurances are easy to restrict on (Korpi & 
Palme 2003: 433-434). 
 
7.2 Power resource theory 
 
As the name suggests power resource theory has been created based on the 
relationship of power between actors. These relations make it possible to see 
power structure in society a longer period of time (Korpi 1998: 38). 
According to Korpi the theory started to develop during the late 1960’s, with 
its origin in neo-Marxist theory. Power resource theory has a distinct angle toward 
socio-economical class and class conflicts (Korpi 1998: vii, Olsen & O’Connor 
1998: 6). In this research I am using the power resource conflict between 
employers and employees and what part the unions have in the conflict. Because 
the theory is based on power relationships the definition of power and power 
resources becomes crucial for the subject. For this research “power resource” will 
be defined by Walter Korpi’s definition in Power Resources Approach vs Action 
and Conflict (1998: 42).  
 
“[…] define power resources as the attributes (capacities or means) of actors 
(individuals or collectives) which enable them to reward or to punish other 
actors.” 
 
Hence, a resource that an actor holds, e.g. money or property that allows the 
possessor of the resource to either pressure or reward another actor is defined as a 
power resource.  
In power resource theory the conflicts between different socio- economic 
classes are important. These differences are clearly visible in the labor market. 
Often the socio-economical class is defined by where the individual works and 
what kind of higher educations the person has (Korpi & Palme 2003: 425, 427).  
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The labor unions hold their power through politics (Olsen & O’Connor 1998: 
6). By engaging and wining the voices of the labor force they are representing the 
unions are able to gain power and therefore effect the power relation involving the 
employer and the employee. Power resource theory base its argument on the 
assets, the resources is power that the actors have. The owner of the resource can 
modify these assets if the interest conflict should need it (Korpi & Palme 2003: 
427). The prime power resource the union holds is that of the organized labor 
force (Rothstein 1992: 37). If the unions would not have an unemployment fund 
and be able to ensure those members who do not hold a job that they will manage 
with the help of the fund administrated by the unions, the workers will start to 
underbid the wage that the unions and employers have decide together upon 
(Rothstein 1992: 37). This would inevitably lead to decreasing wages and the 
union’s not obtaining their prime power resource. In addition it would lead to a 
labor market based on the employer’s condition. Even though power resource 
theory states that there is an ongoing conflict between classes the theory also says 
that power is fluid and can therefore be transferred between different actors on the 
capitalist market (Olsen & O’Connor 1998: 6).  
The most typical and basic power resources in the developed part of the world 
are among others: threat and use of violence, owning property, and labor force. 
Owning property means that the owner possesses control over the production, 
which means control over people’s means of living (Korpi 1998: 44). Power 
resources can roughly be divided into: physical capital, as the above-mentioned 
example of property owning, money and human capital. The different types of 
power resources fulfill the categories mentioned before differently. For example 
human capital (e.g. knowledge, education, and the labor force), unlike money and 
physical capital it is not a resource that is short in supply. The mobilization of 
human capital include high costs since it is difficult to organize and mobilize 
people, besides knowledge can never be taken away from the person, it can only 
be rented as Korpi states (1998: 44-45). Furthermore Korpi writes that since the 
difference between capital (owning property or money) and human capital power 
resources are very different from one and other. Korpi (Korpi 1998: 51; Korpi & 
Palme 2003: 427) therefore states that it is reasonable to think in capitalist 
democracies since there is power resource difference between employers and 
company owners have the greater power resources while employees have the 
lesser of power resources.  
Additionally, Korpi writes that states and governments have seen this unequal 
share of power and therefore, by law to some extent regulated and 
institutionalized power resources of the employers.  Through laws that controls 
how workers can get hired or fired and the employers’ entitlements to rule over 
the worker by giving them orders that must be followed during time on the work. 
The workers obligation to follow these orders are yet another way to 
institutionalize the different power resources and even giving the upper hand to 
the employer (Korpi 1998: 51).   
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8 Analysis 
The analysis starts with a more general discussion and analysis of the identified 
power resources in labor unions. The two latter sections are directed to the two 
variables presented earlier in the essay. 
8.1 Identifying the labor unions power resources 
In the analysis I will use the theory applied to the case of labor unions and the two 
different factors that may or may not affect the degree of unionization the last 
decade.  
Power resource theory is easily applied to onto labor unions and their roll and 
relation to the labor market and the actors on the labor market e.g. employers, 
business owners and other capital holders. One elemental thought in liberal 
economy and liberal view of the labor market is that the unions disturb the 
balance between the labor force and the amount of job opportunities. The liberal 
view is of the idea the union’s only work in favor of those who are members and 
benefit from the wage agreements they agree on (Fregert & Jonung 2010: 203). 
With this point of view in mind there is an obvious conflict of interest between the 
two actors on the labor market, employers and labor unions.  
Labor unions and employers have different types of power resources. The 
unions have in particularly the control over the labor force. Since the union 
density is high in both Sweden and Denmark the power of the unions are stronger. 
The more members the unions have from the labor force, the stronger power 
resource they have. Countries where the degree of unionization is low, the unions 
do not have the power resource that the unions in Sweden and Denmark have. 
Since the unions biggest and strongest power resource is the control of the supply 
of labor force they are eager to not lose members and instead gain the new 
individuals entering into the labor force. Should workers start underbidding the 
union set wage level it would change the power relationship between employers 
and labor unions. Therefore it is somewhat crucial for labor unions to have 
collective agreements. This of course also benefits the individual worker 
(Rothstein 1992: 40). Individual employees have in notion no power against the 
employer. This is because of the demand for workers are lower than the supply of 
workers. For that reason individual workers benefit from joining the labor unions. 
It gives them a possibility to be a power resource against the employer. Business 
interests are one of the strongest power resources, according to Korpi and Palme 
(2003: 428). They often contain capital in both means of money and in owning 
property. Employers are not interested in low unemployment rates since it would 
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lead to a balance in demand and supply in the labor force. When the 
unemployment rates are high it gives the employer the possibility to pick and 
choose from the labor force, which include dropping wages and hiring only those 
who accepts a lower wage than decided between the unions and the employers in 
collective agreements i.e. undermining the labor unions.  
For labor unions to obtain their power resource it is imperative that they do 
not lose members and that they instead gain new ones. However, as Figure 1 
illustrates this is not the case. Unions in both Sweden and Denmark are losing 
members and have done so since the middle of the 1990’s.  
 
8.2 The price development of the unemployment 
funds  
 
In Sweden the last ten to fifteen years the price of the unemployment funds 
membership fees have varied a lot. In Denmark the monthly rate paid to the 
unemployment funds varies, from 408 DKK to 524 DKK (Ak-Samvirke 2014). 
Even though Kjellberg (2010: 39) states that Sweden is the only country with 
differentiated fees.  
In Sweden there is a distinct link between which kinds of unemployment fund 
and how much the price increased. While the fees for the white-collar funds only 
was raised significantly, the fees for workers in the blue-collar funds where raised 
far more. It is possible to link this to the fact that it was a right-wing government 
in power at the time (Kjellberg). According to Kjellberg the increased fees was 
made for filling budgetary wholes and for the government to be able to finance the 
tax reduction they promised the voters. As mentioned before the fees increase a 
lot more for blue- collar workers then white- collar workers (Kjellberg 2010: 19). 
By raising the fees, it can be argued that the government at the time tried to 
decrease the membership levels of the unions (Kjellberg 2010: 11). Therefore a 
class conflict according to power resource theory can be detected in the way the 
fees increased. The white-collar workers i.e. individuals with higher education, 
their fees were not as high as the blue-collar workers, e.g. jobs in production and 
other places where higher education is not needed.  
Workplaces that hire manual and production worker are more often subjected 
for unemployment and tend to be sensitive for the economical fluctuations (Van 
Rie et al. 2011: 134). The same work places also have a tendency to classify as 
low on the socio- economic ladder. With the fees rising as much as they did 
workers were situated in a place where they had to assess whether the benefit of 
being a member was higher or lower to the actual benefits earned of a 
membership (Kjellberg 2010: 37). Furthermore, the workers still had to decide if 
they would like to pay both the fees, one for the membership is the unemployment 
funds and one fee for the membership in the labor union. Choosing to disregard 
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the latter is what happened in several cases. The government used their power 
resources in the form policy changes that lead to increased unemployment fund 
fees that lead to a decline in member is both the unemployment funds and the 
unions. This increase of fees affected the working class in a higher degree than the 
other socio- economical classes. Unions organizing under LO, 
Landsorganisationen, that gathers the production workers and other unskilled 
professions hade the highest fees for the unemployment funds (Kjellberg 2010: 
19).  
Before 2007 the membership fee to the union governed unemployment fund 
was about 90-100 SEK, although the fee differs from fund to fund. Typically the 
funds were at one level for all of the unemployment funds administrated by the 
labor unions but since the changes that the right wing government declared in 
January 2007 this changed. The membership fees were increased dramatically; 
also the system that regulated that the fees and other resources would be shared 
equally was abolished. The system worked in a way that funds with higher degree 
of unemployed members received a higher share of the funds (Kjellberg 2010: 5). 
The latter lead to high differences in membership fees, members in labor unions 
representing workers in hotel and restaurant business paid a fee of 430 SEK while 
unions organizing academics only paid 90 SEK (Kjellberg 2010: 52).  
Raising the fees for the working class can be identified as a way of trying to 
decease the tendencies to join the labor unions. With declining membership levels 
in the unions it would lead to their power resource i.e. the control of the labor 
supply getting weaker and the employers instead growing stronger and controlling 
the labor market. Should this happen, workers that are not members in labor 
unions have the possibility to underbid the collective agreement, i.e. employers 
will decrease the wages and workers will start underbidding one another. As 
stated before, the labor unions only have one strong power resource, the control of 
the labor force. Liberal politics, as the right –wing coalition had in Sweden from 
2006 onwards of course affects the labor market politics. Labor unions have a 
history of emerging from the working class (Rothstein 1992: 33), and the unions 
directly collide with the liberal politics driven by the Alliance (coalition of the 
center- and right wing parties in Sweden) since 2006.  
Right before the two big recessions in Sweden the degree of unionization has 
declined. In times of good economical wealth and low degree of unemployment 
workers step out of the funds. Before the recession in the begging of the 1990’s 
union’s memberships were low, when the labor force understood what was 
happening and the risk of unemployment got higher, more people joined the labor 
unions as a way of risk averting. After the recession was over and the economy 
turned once again there was a decline of membership levels. During the recession 
in 2007-2008 however, this did not happen. Ever since the levels of mid 1990 are 
the union density levels have steadily declined. Therefore it is possible that to 
some degree discard Lind’s (2009: 528) idea of increasing memberships in times 
of higher risk of unemployment since the argument is only valid for one of the big 
recessions. The unemployment rates for both Denmark and Sweden have only 
recently started to decline (Comparative political data set). Even though the 
unemployment numbers were not as high as during the big recession in the 1990’s 
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(Sjöberg 2011: 211), there is no sign of union memberships increasing as a result 
of the higher risk of unemployment.  
The above-explained phenomenon, that workers do not become members even 
though there is a risk for it, can be derived from the idea that worker no longer can 
afford the memberships. The recession hit Sweden between 2007-2008, at the 
same time that the prices for the unemployment fees were increase. The perceived 
benefit of the membership is, as it appears not as high to be prioritized before 
other expenses in the household.  
Regarding the Danish fees for unemployment funds they have increased as 
well. However, the Danish fees have gotten higher since the beginning of the 
2000’s and have steadily increased after that. In 2012 the price had increased with 
almost 20 % since 2001 (OECD 2001-2012). The graph showing the price 
development for fees for being a member in an unemployment funds in Denmark 
follows the union density graph but in the reverse direction. 
Since the 1960’s the Danish state have subsidized the unemployment funds 
and paid large portions of it. However, with the increased fees this can be a way to 
decrease the state funding and force the workers to pay a larger amount for the 
funds (Lind 2009: 514). In the Swedish reform in 2007 the possibility to reduce 
taxes; the state subsidization for unemployment insurance and membership in 
labor unions was removed. Removing these potential tax reductions resulted in a 
net increase of the membership fees in both the unions and the unemployment 
fund. This would inevitably lead to a decrease in membership levels. The state 
subsidizations are crucial for the union’s membership levels (Kjellberg 2000: 40-
41). Again, there are policy changes that directly affect the worker and how much 
they have to pay. By increasing the fees the member will inevitably decrease 
which in turn lead to weaker unions.  
In 2001 the Danish Liberal-conservative government proposed a policy that 
aimed to abolish the Ghent system. However, the proposition did not have 
majority so they instead passed legislation that changed unemployment funds in 
the way that it would be possible for them to have members working in different 
professions and having different education. Before the policy changes it was only 
the Christian unemployment fund that hade the possibility of recruiting all of the 
members from the labor force. This change has led to unemployment funds now 
competing with each other for members (Lind 2009: 515). According to Lind 
(2000: 515) political policy changes like the one mentioned above, forcing the 
unions to compete with each other affect the willingness to join both the 
unemployment fund and the labor unions. In the long run policy changes like that 
affects the unemployment funds in a way that resembles the system of a 
mandatory state-run one. The change in 2001 was led by the Liberal –
conservative party. There is a difference between Sweden and Denmark in this 
case, while Denmark’s labor unions have to compete against each other for 
members, Sweden have a segregated system where blue- collar and white- collar 
unions are separated from each other (Kjellberg 2011: 73).  
According to Kjellberg (2000: 9) the reform the right wing government went 
through with will affect future membership levels not only to the union 
administrated unemployment funds but also to the labor unions as a whole. When 
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passing the new reform the government referred to reduce taxes for those who 
work. However, this tax reduction would not impact the new labor force e.g. 
young adults and immigrants and they would therefore only consider the price at 
the moment if and when they become members (Kjellberg 2000: 58).  
Governments that are elected for a period of 4 year have greater power then many 
realize. By this kind of policy changes the labor unions are affected for more than 
the time period the government are elected.  
The policies that the Swedish and Danish governments have implemented the 
last ten years will affect the labor market a lot longer than the government’s rule. 
With higher fees for unemployment funds, workers are forced to take a stand, 
which is based on a financial ground. As the statistics have shown, workers have 
made their choice; more and more people choose to stand outside of the 
unemployment funds and put their livelihood at risk.  
A reason for why, even though both Denmark and Sweden have high 
unionization degree maybe that the price of the unemployment insurance fund 
differ quite a bit (Clasen & Vibrock 2008: 444). The reason for this is primarily 
the differences in state funding. Before the Swedish government reformed the 
unemployment insurance system in 2007 the cost was only around 100 SEK, 
while at the same period the price in Denmark was around 400- 500 DKK (Goul 
Andersen 2011: 193). 
To summarize this section of the analysis: the price of the unemployment 
funds has been discussed as reason for the degree of unionization to decline. 
When raising the price can be connected to a center- right wing government you 
can possibly draw conclusions to a class conflict on a governmental level. The 
center- right winged government does not have the same view of the labor unions 
and their roll on the labor market as a left- social democratic one would. The 
funding of the insurance funds is made up partially by the state and partially by 
the actual fee that members have to pay (Clasen & Vibrock 2008: 442). When a 
state then increases the benefits it is a way for them to decrease their own funding. 
This goes hand in hand with the idea of center- right wing governments 
decreasing the funds for the welfare state and instead demonstrates their politics 
for the labor market. 
. 
8.3 The unemployment funds replacement rates as a 
factor  
 
Replacement rate is the percentage of the former wage a worker receives when 
unemployed; hereafter the amount given is also called unemployment benefit. 
Illustrated in Figure 3 earlier in this essay were the net replacement rates for 
Sweden and Denmark. In Denmark’s case there is constant decline since many 
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years. However, in Sweden’s case there is a disturbance in the otherwise quite 
similar graph to Denmark.   
Even though the official number for replacement rates have been high in some 
cases the amount earned by the receiver at the end tends not be as high. The 
replacement rate in Sweden in 1990 was 90 %, same year in Denmark it was the 
same percentage. However, the maximum amount that an unemployed worker can 
acquire is much lower than 90 % of his or her salary because of the maximum 
ceiling. The amount that the ceiling is set for is decided by politicians and is to 
some extent varied by the government’s ideology. Both Sweden and Denmark 
have in recent years changed their labor market politics in such a way that 
unemployment benefits are lowered so that incitement for finding a job will 
increase. The benefits are at a level that mainly work as a temporarily solution. 
(Goul Andersen 2011: 202; Sjöberg 2011: 222). In 2010 the replacement rate in 
Denmark was 90 % up to the maximum ceiling which was 195 528 DKK (Goul 
Andersen 2011: 192-193). The equivalent numbers in Sweden for the same year 
was from day 1 to 200: 80 %, 201 until 300: 70 %. The ceiling was stated at 63€ 
per day (Sjöberg 2011: 212).  
The maximum amount that a worker can receive mostly affects those who 
have middle to high income since they reach the maximum level sooner than low 
income earners. Nevertheless, the biggest concern is not with the white-collar 
funds that have some of the lowest replacement rates but with the funds that have 
workers with a higher risk of unemployment. The unemployment benefits have 
tendency to become a flat rate everyone is qualified the same amount of money 
(Goul Andersen 2011: 188). According to both Goul Andersen (2011: 188) and 
Sjöberg (2011: 223), the amount of the unemployment benefit has declined 
relatively to the workers’ wages. When politicians decide on the size of the 
benefits, whether it should increase or decrease they do not consider that the 
prices and wages increases for every year and therefore the benefits actually 
decline.  
With lower replacement rates a part of the incentives to become member of an 
unemployment funds and hence, a labor union declines. By 2010 the rates were so 
low that many workers turned to other forms of insurance to cover their potential 
needs. In the Swedish collective agreements there are many times a special clause 
which entitles the worker to higher replacement rates. The collective agreement is 
ruled by the labor unions; those who are members can only use the benefit 
(Sjöberg 2011: 233). However, in some cases these kind of extra insurances have 
been too expensive for the unions, especially in those who have a higher risk of 
member in unemployment e.g. constructors and builders (Kjellberg 2010: 16; 
Sjöberg 2011: 224). The further insurances are mainly used by the middle class 
and above to be able to cover for the standard of life they have grown accustomed 
to. The working class is more inclined to use the public funds and only pay the 
fees for the unemployment fund. The fact that there is a possibility to sign 
additional insurance will only increase the divide between the different socio- 
economical classes (Korpi & Palme 2003: 431-432).  
The fact that the Danish workers when unemployed receive maximum benefits 
of 2187 € a month while the Swedish equivalent is almost half of that amount, 
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1260 €. This might explain the rapid decline of unionization in Sweden but the 
more leveled decline in Denmark (Figure 1). The ceiling of the unemployment 
benefits, and the unemployment insurance over all have a tendency of being 
subjected for cuts when the governmental budgets are strained (Huber & 
Stephens). 
As Sjöberg writes (2011: 211), one of the promises of the Alliance (center- 
right wing parties in cooperation) in Sweden for the election of 2006 was to 
reform the labor market in a way that would make having a job more beneficial. 
By introducing tax reductions for income and by reforming the unemployment 
benefits. As discussed before, raising the price of the unemployment insurance 
funds was one way. There has been somewhat consensus between the Swedish 
Social Democrats and the Alliance in decreasing the amount of the benefits and 
instead more effort on activities that can help the individual with finding a job. 
Raising the taxes, as a way of funding is not a way the alliance would chose in the 
first hand. While typically representing the middle class that have the possibility 
to afford private unemployment insurances the reforms increases the split between 
different socio- economical classes (Korpi & Palme 2003: 431). Changing the 
possibility to reduce tax for memberships in unions and unemployment funds 
have led to declining membership levels in both. This applies for both Sweden 
and Denmark (Van Rie et al. 2011: 128-129). 
The Danish unemployment insurance system has changed from being one of 
the most inclusive to continual reforms making the insurance more and more 
restricted and exclusive. (Goul Andersen 2011: 191). Goul Andersen writes   that 
the declines in memberships for unemployment funds cannot be linked to 
conditions that have to be fulfilled have been changed and more regulated. 
However, statistical data shows differently. Higher prices as well as lower 
replacement rates have in impact on membership in both unemployment funds 
and labor unions.  
In both Sweden and Denmark the reforms that aim to tighten the possibility to 
receive, and lower the unemployment benefits mostly affects the working class. 
While unemployment and poverty is more common with employees in production 
and manufacturing (Korpi & Palme 2003: 431-432). Since the reforms in a higher 
degree have a negative outcome on the working class the rifts between the 
different classes will inevitably increase. The risks of large cuts from the welfare 
state have been bigger with right- center winged government, and lowest with a 
left government. Especially during times of high unemployment does the above 
mentioned apply (Korpi & Palme 2003: 436, 439).  
The governments in respective country use policy changes and reforms to the 
labor market to control the labor force. By using their legislative power they 
decide without discussing with the labor unions and other actors on the labor 
market (Goul Andersen 2011: 200). Through that the government in power can be 
seen as dictating the labor market. In a way they are deciding the rules in the 
game that is the labor market. Depending on what party is in government and 
what ideology they represent the outcome of the rules will differentiate. As 
mentioned earlier, liberal and center governments have higher tendencies to 
inform cuts to the welfare system as a way of means to increase the job 
  20 
opportunities and push people into work. Left or social democratic governments 
on the other hand are more inclined to funding the welfare system and have a 
relatively higher benefit system to secure the worker when unemployed, sick or 
when staying at home with children.  
Within the Swedish social democrats their have since the 1980’s been a dived, 
one part thinks that the economic incentives are effective on the labor market and 
the other side defending the system that was until the mid-2000’s. During the 
election in 2010, the green, left party, and the social democrats were in coalition 
together. One of the promises if elected was that they would increase the 
replacement rates that the government at the time had lowered. However, the left 
party had intensions of raising the replacement rates back to 90% while the green 
party actually wanted to abolish the Ghent system and instead establish a 
mandatory system of unemployment insurance. 
The incitements behind enhancing the divide between classes by cutting funds 
for the unemployment funds can potentially be an idea of concurrence between 
workers and low incomes leading to people in the labor force standing without job 
actually searching for jobs and job opportunities. However, these kinds of policy 
changes also lead to poverty as mentioned before. The security aspects of the 
benefits are not at all considered. 
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9 Conclusion 
Even though the unemployment funds are strongly interlinked with the labor 
unions there are potential other factors that might in some degree also affect the 
declining levels of union density. The globalized market where outsourcing of 
production and manufacturing is happening is one of possible factors. The 
restructuring of the labor market as a consequence of globalization, when typical 
blue-collar job are being outsourced and the labor market tends to become more 
dependent on knowledge and service.  Nevertheless, unemployment funds and 
labor union in countries with the Ghent system continues to be strongly associated 
with each other (Lind 2007: 52-53). 
Governmental policy changes have a clear impact on the workers degree on 
joining the labor unions. Governments that primarily have belonged on the center, 
and right side of politics, have reformed the unemployment insurances system 
which has led to decreasing number in both the unemployment funds and the 
labor unions. In Sweden as well as Denmark propositions from the center- right 
wing parties have been proposed to eradicate the voluntary insurance funds and 
instead apply a mandatory one. However, neither proposition had a majority in 
parliament. Their try to directly get in the way of the labor union’s power resource 
were stopped. Instead they used indirect ways, by shock raising the fees, and 
lowering the net replacement rates the right winged governments have in some 
senses destabilized the labor unions.  
What has been pin pointed in the analysis is that center- right wing 
government have a higher inclination of cutting down funds for the welfare state. 
This is a way to finance other posts in the countries budget and at the same time 
lowering the incitement for worker to join unemployment funds and labor unions 
(Rothstein 1992: 51). Since liberal politics have a fundamental idea of a free 
market, labor union are seen as obstacles and in the way of a more effective labor 
market, this is not surprising. In power resource conflicts on governmental stage 
outcome concerning the welfare state is common (Korpi 2003: 590, 605).  
A conclusion that can be drawn based on the analysis is that social democratic 
parties that throughout history have had a close relationship with the labor unions 
have adopted political reforms that have previously been linked to the liberal 
parties. Some of the reforms that have included cutbacks in the unemployment 
insurance that have been discussed have been agreed upon in political consensus.  
The hypothesis that was presented in the beginning of the essay can thus be 
argued as correct. The reforms discussed in the analysis and by whom they have 
been proposed seems to prove the hypothesis. Since there is a socio- economical 
class conflict between labor unions and center- right winged governments as 
proven by the different reforms these kinds of governments have proposed in 
Denmark and Sweden it strengthens the hypothesis.   
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Moreover, since the level of unionization does not show signs of changing in 
the trend it has had for the last fifteen years it is crucial for the labor unions to find 
other ways to recruit new members if they will continue as a power factor on the 
labor market. The unemployment insurances have changed and so has the labor 
unions, by modernizing and offering new services for the workers and challenge 
the employers I would say that there is a chance for the labor unions to become 
the strong power factor that they once were.  
 
.  
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10 Suggestions on future research 
As mentioned before, for an even deeper analysis, a potential strategy for another 
essay or similar is to use primary sources to obtain another dimension to the 
essay. Other topics that also would be interesting to follow up on would be: why 
have the unemployment funds fee declined to former price levels in Sweden? Can 
this change be lined to the upcoming election for parliament or are there other 
incentives to decrease the cost. 
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